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Solving Immigration Consultant Fraud
Through Expanded Federal Accreditation
Emily A. Ungert
Introduction
Catalina Garcia Nufiez is a Mexican national who moved to
the United States in 1989.' In 1996, the family that employed
Nufiez as a nanny offered to sponsor her in the labor certification
process,2 which allows a foreigner to work in the United States.'
Nufiez went to the office of "General Legal Services" for help.' Re-
lying on a friend's recommendation, and judging from the office's
busy waiting room, Nufiez believed the business was legitimate.5
But the woman who owned and operated the business, Reyna
Dorantes, was not a licensed attorney and was not authorized to
offer legal services of any kind.! When Nuiiez met with Dorantes,
she told Nufiez that she had friends inside the Immigration and
Naturalization Service (INS)7 and that she could expedite Nufitez's
labor certification and immigration papers.! Nuitez gave Dorantes
her background information and a first payment of $1500.9
A month later, Nuitez returned to the office after being told to
bring her Mexican passport and a second payment of $1000.10 Two
months after the initial appointment, Dorantes called Nufiez and
t. J.D. expected 2012, University of Minnesota Law School. I would like to
thank my family for their infinite love and support, and the staff and editors of Law
and Inequality for their encouragement and contributions.
1. Nufiez v. Gonzales, 231 F. App'x 666, 667 (9th Cir. 2007).
2. Brief for Appellant at 4, Nufiez v. Gonzales, 231 F. App'x 666 (9th Cir. 2007)
(No. 05-76361), 2006 WL 3879025 at *1 [hereinafter Brief for Nufiezi.
3. Hiring Foreign Workers, Foreign Labor Certification, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR,
http://www.foreignlaborcert.doleta.gov/hiring.cfm (last updated Jan. 11, 2011).
4. Nufrez, 231 F. App'x at 667; Brief for Nufiez, supra note 2, at 4.
5. Brief for Nufiez, supra note 2, at 4.
6. Nuuiez, 231 F. App'x at 667 n.2; Brief for Nufiez, supra note 2, at 4.
7. The INS is now the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE). See Homeland Security Act of 2002,
Pub. L. No. 107-296 §§ 451, 471, 116 Stat. 2135, 2195, 2205; see also 6 U.S.C. §§
252, 542 note (2006) (Reorganization Plan Modification for the Department of
Homeland Security).
8. Brief for Nufiez, supra note 2, at 4.
9. Id. at 4-5.
10. Id. at 5.
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told her that her "legal permanent residency was ready."" Nufiez
went to the office and Dorantes returned her passport with a red
stamp inside in exchange for a final payment." Dorantes had
forged the stamp, but she told Nufiez the INS had stamped the
passport as temporary evidence of Nufiez's legal residency and
that Nufiez's residency card would arrive in the mail in another
twelve to twenty-four months." Nufiez believed she was a legal
permanent resident-she used her stamped passport to obtain a
driver's license and social security card, and even to travel
internationally. 4
Unbeknownst to Nufiez, Dorantes had filed an application for
asylum in her name." The application contained false informa-
tion, including statements that Nufiez had completed the applica-
tion without assistance and that her home address was 3168 East
Gage Avenue, Huntington Park, California, the address of "Gener-
al Legal Services." 6 The INS processed the application and, in
March 1997, initiated deportation proceedings against Nuiez."
An order to show cause, charging Nufiez and giving notice of her
scheduled deportation hearing, was served on the Gage Avenue
address." Nufiez, unaware of the application or the hearing,
failed to appear at the hearing and, in her absence, the
immigration judge ordered her deportation to Mexico.19
A year after receiving her stamped passport, Nufiez called
Dorantes to inquire why she had not yet received her residency
card and whether she should renew the stamp." Dorantes told
Nufiez that she did not need to renew it and that it was common to
wait for the card for up to two years." After another year had
passed and Nufiez still had not received her residency card, she
went to visit Dorantes." Instead of "General Legal Services," she
found a vacant office. Dorantes had vanished along with the furni-
ture, computers, files and telephones." Nufiez consulted with
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Nuflez v. Gonzales, 231 F. App'x 666, 667 (9th Cir. 2007); Brief for Nufiez,
supra note 2, at 5.
14. Nufiez, 231 F. App'x at 667; Brief for Nufiez, supra note 2, at 6.
15. Nuflez, 231 F. App'x at 667; Brief for Nufiez, supra note 2, at 7-8.
16. Nufiez, 231 F. App'x at 668 n.3; Brief for Nufiez, supra note 2, at 8.
17. Nufiez, 231 F. App'x at 667.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.; Brief for Nufiez, supra note 2, at 6.
21. Nuez, 231 F. App'x at 667; Brief for Nufiez, supra note 2, at 6.
22. Nufiez, 231 F. App'x at 667; Brief for Nufiez, supra note 2, at 7.
23. Nurtez, 231 F. App'x at 667; Brief for Nufiez, supra note 2, at 7.
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several attorneys; they all concluded that Dorantes had defrauded
her by taking her $3500 and forging the stamp.24
Nufiez hired another lawyer to begin the labor certification
process again.25 When the lawyer heard Nufiez's story, he re-
quested her immigration records from the government.26 Finally,
Nufiez discovered that an asylum application had been filed in her
name and that the government had responded by ordering her
deportation, all without her knowledge, consent, or participation.27
Nufitez heard rumors that Dorantes had also scammed other cli-
ents and then left the state.28 Nufiez, on the other hand, was left
with a deportation order, which she could not contest because the
statute of limitations had run."
Catalina Nufiez was a victim of immigration consultant
fraud, often called "notario fraud." Immigration consultant fraud
occurs when lay persons or notaries public hold themselves out as
authorized to give legal advice and represent people in immigra-
tion matters.2 0 The consequences are often devastating." The
fraudulent consultants may charge hefty fees without providing
services in exchange;3 2 or, as in the case of Catalina Nufiez, they
may file incorrect or improper visa applications that alert the
government to their client's illegal status and result in deportation
proceedings." Either way, the client loses hard-earned money and
a chance at remaining in the country legally.4 The latter form of
fraud also harms the government. It burdens the immigration
administration because it must spend time evaluating the false
information supplied instead of processing proper applications."
24. Nufiez, 231 F. App'x at 667; Brief for Nufiez, supra note 2, at 7.
25. Nufiez, 231 F. App'x at 668; Brief for Nufiez, supra note 2, at 7.
26. Nufiez, 231 F. App'x at 668; Brief for Nufiez, supra note 2, at 7.
27. Nufiez, 231 F. App'x at 668; Brief for Nufiez, supra note 2, at 7-8.
28. Nuriez, 231 F. App'x at 667; Brief for Nufiez, supra note 2, at 7.
29. See Nufrez, 231 F. App'x at 668. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)
denied Nufiez's motion to reopen the case as untimely. Id. The immigration judge
held that the statute of limitations should not be tolled due to fraud and ineffective
assistance of counsel because Nufiez "failed to act with due diligence in discovering
the notary's misconduct" and the BIA adopted the holding. Id. Nufiez appealed
and the Ninth Circuit reversed the holding, finding exceptional circumstances
meriting equitable tolling, and remanded her case to be reopened. Id. at 669.
30. See Anne E. Langford, What's in a Name?: Notarios in the United States
and the Exploitation of a Vulnerable Latino Immigrant Population, 7 HARV. LATINO
L. REV. 115, 116-17 (2004) (explaining the phenomenon of "notario fraud").
31. See, e.g., id. at 116.
32. Id. at 124.
33. Nufrez, 231 F. App'x at 667.
34. Langford, supra note 30, at 116, 124.
35. Andrew F. Moore, Fraud, the Unauthorized Practice of Law and Unmet
2011] 427
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It also burdens the courts because immigrants may appeal their
deportation orders on the grounds of ineffective assistance of
counsel, forcing the courts to expend resources to correct the
misdeeds of unscrupulous immigration consultants.
This immigration fraud occurs throughout the nation on a
consistent basis. It has been widely documented by the media over
the last decade." While federal and state governments have en-
acted laws aimed at combating it,' these laws are under-enforced,
in part because illegal immigrants who are victimized rarely re-
port the fraud to the government." Instead, the burden falls on
community organizations such as non-profits, churches, and bar
associations to fight the fraud by promoting awareness and solicit-
ing complaints.' Despite their efforts, the problem persists."
Instead of continued reliance on post facto enforcement, the
government should turn its efforts to prevention. Immigration
consultant fraud is fueled by an unmet need for accessible and af-
fordable immigration services.42 The need for the services they
sell, combined with the vulnerability of the population they serve,
enables these fraudulent consultants to be so successful."
Government training, accreditation, and regulation of immigration
consultants, coupled with increased legal authority and profit-
ability for the profession, would result in an influx of competent
and accountable individuals to meet the needs of immigrant com-
munities." The federal government needs to stop immigration
fraud where it starts. It can do this by embracing the role of immi-
gration consultants in the community and in the system instead of
trying to chase down its perpetrators one by one as the number of
victims continues to grow.
Part I of this Article explores the source and scope of immi-
gration consultant fraud. Part II summarizes the attempts of
state and federal government and non-governmental organizations
to eliminate immigration consultant fraud. Part III explains why,
despite those attempts, the fraud persists and flourishes. Part IV
Needs: A Look at State Laws Regulating Immigration Assistants, 19 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 1, 6 (2004).
36. See, e.g., Nuflez, 231 F. App'x at 668.
37. See infra Part I.B.
38. See infra Parts II.A-B.
39. See infra Part III.
40. See infra Part II.C.
41. See infra Part III.
42. See Moore, supra note 35, at 9.
43. See id.
44. See infra Part IV.
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sets forth a proposal for expanding the role of lawful immigration
consultants and explains how such an expansion would decrease
immigration consultant fraud.
I. The Source and Scope of Immigration Consultant Fraud
A. "Notario Fraud": How the Law Is Lost in Translation
Immigration consultant fraud is most commonly referred to
as "notario fraud."" "Notary" literally translates into Spanish as
"notario."" The two terms, however, are not equivalent. In many
Spanish-speaking countries, a "notario publico" is a legal
professional or specialist; they often have law degrees and/or hold
a public office." In contrast, a "notary public" in the United States
is only authorized to authenticate signatures, administer oaths,
certify documents, and perform limited official acts.' Notaries are
not authorized to give legal advice or prepare legal documents,
unless the notary is also a licensed attorney."
It is easy to see how this discrepancy creates confusion
among Spanish speakers as to a notary's legal qualifications and
authority. Many notarios have chosen this term specifically to
create a false impression, gain clients' trust, and charge higher
fees for services they cannot legally perform.o In fact, the term
has become so synonymous with this phenomenon in the United
States that "notario" is often used to refer to any fraudulent
immigration consultant." The practice of defrauding people
45. See, e.g., About Notario Fraud, AM. BAR Ass'N COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION,
http://new.abanet.org/Immigration/Pages/aboutnotariofraud.aspx (last visited Apr.
21, 2011).
46. HENRY SAINT DAHL, McGRAw-HILL'S SPANISH AND ENGLISH LEGAL
DICTIONARY 409 (2006).
47. See Milagros Cisneros, H.B. 2659: Notorious Notaries-How Arizona Is
Curbing Notario Fraud in the Immigrant Community, 32 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 287, 294
(2000) ("Latin notaries, in contrast to American notaries public, are state-appointed
. . . ."); Langford, supra note 30, at 120 ("[T]here is a high de facto correlation
between having a law degree and being a notario."); Esencia de la Funcion
Notarial: Principales Actividades del Notario, COLEGIO DE NOTARIOS DEL DISTRITO
FEDERAL, http://www.colegiodenotarios.org.mx/index.php?a=71 (last visted Apr. 12,
2011) ("[El notario] ... es un especialista y un perito en derecho . . .
48. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 492 (3d pocket ed. 2006).
49. See What Is a Notary?, NAT'L NOTARY Ass'N, http://www.nationalnotary.org
what-is notary/index.html (last visited Apr. 12, 2011).
50. Careen Shannon, Regulating Immigration Legal Service Providers:
Inadequate Representation and Notario Fraud, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 577, 588-89
(2009). See infra Part IIA-B for discussion of how legislatures have reacted to
persons holding themselves out as "notarios" by regulating the commercial use of
the term.
51. See, e.g., The Dangers of "Notario" Fraud, COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION, AM.
2011] 429
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seeking immigration documents is uniformly referred to as
"notario fraud."" This term is improper, however, because it
mischaracterizes the problem. "Notario fraud" implies fraud
perpetrated by notaries public upon Spanish-speaking immigrants
when the problem is actually much broader in scope.
B. The Many Faces of Fraud
Immigration scams are orchestrated by a variety of
individuals and organizations across the nation and they affect
people of many different nationalities." Immigration con artists
can operate successfully as individuals out of their own homes or
as part of a firm. Miriam Mercedes Hernandez worked out of her
apartment selling immigration services for up to $15,000 per
person." When her clients complained that she never performed
the services promised and requested a refund, she threatened to
have them deported and kept their money and documents.'
Hernandez was brought to court and ordered to pay $3 million in
restitution and penalties.
Immigration scams can also operate under a business, which
lends perceived legitimacy to their operations.' As mentioned in
the introduction, Dorantes operated out of an office under the
business title "General Legal Services."" For some, the fraud is so
lucrative that they operate multiple businesses." Edwin Rivera
operated four companies that illegally purported to provide
BAR Ass'N, http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/migrated/Immigration/
PublicDocuments/notarios-info-piece englishfinal.authcheckdam.pdf (last visited
Apr. 21, 2011) ("You may be the victim of a notario if: You sought assistance with
your immigration case from someone who called themselves a: Notario[]
NotarioPublico[,] Visa Consultant[,] [or] Immigration Consultant.. .
52. See, e.g., id.
53. See infra notes 72-80 and accompanying text.
54. See infra notes 64-80 and accompanying text.
55. People v. Hernandez, No. 401160-09, 2010 WL 3843085 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb.
25, 2010); Press Release, Office of the Attorney Gen., Attorney General Cuomo
Obtains $3 Million Court Judgment Against Queens Woman in Immigration Scam
(Mar. 1, 2010), available at http://www.ag.ny.gov/media_center/2010/mar/marla
10.html [hereinafter Cuomo Obtains $3 Million Judgment].
56. Petition of Attorney General 1 18, People v. Hernandez, No. 4011602009
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 25, 2010), 2010 WL 6931743 at*3; Cuomo Obtains $3 Million
Judgment, supra note 55.
57. Cuomo Obtains $3 Million Judgment, supra note 55.
58. Langford, supra note 30, at 122.
59. Nufiez v. Gonzales, 231 Fed. App'x 666, 666 (9th Cir. 2007).
60. Press Release, Office of the Attorney Gen., Attorney General Cuomo Shuts
Down Seven Companies for Providing Fraudulent Legal Services to Immigrant
Communities (Aug. 17, 2010), available at http://www.ag.ny.gov/media-center/
2010/auglaugl7a_10.html [hereinafter Cuomo Shuts Down Seven Companies].
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immigration services." He advertised in newspapers, on radio
shows, and on his website.62 Rivera charged $1500 for applications
under an immigration "law" that was never passed.'
Unfortunately, immigration fraud is so widespread it occurs
even in the institutions that seem most trustworthy. A non-profit
immigrant services organization, American Immigrants Federa-
tion, advertised and sold "membership" for $100 a year, then
charged members thousands of dollars in exchange for services the
organization was not authorized to perform and results it never
delivered.' The organization agreed to pay $1.2 million in restitu-
tion and shut down its operations; it had more than 20,000 cus-
tomers." Even more shocking are reports of religious officials de-
frauding immigrants." Two pastors at a storefront Pentecostal
church in Queens, New York charged between $6000 and $10,000
for the promise of a fictional green card supposedly earmarked for
the church.67 The pastors and an accomplice collected almost $1
million from this scam." When the visas never appeared and
people demanded refunds, the pastors threatened deportation,
stopped responding, and closed the church.6 9 A religious leader
who operated a Hindu temple in Milwaukee was accused of spon-
soring fraudulent religious worker visas.o Using the temple as a
front for his operations, he attempted to sponsor thirty-three such
fraudulent visas and charged up to $30,000 for each."
61. Id.
62. Kevin Murawinski, Immigration 'Lawyer' Was Fraud-Spitzer, DAILY NEWS
(N.Y.), July 2, 2004, at 2, available at http://www.nydailynews.com/archives/
ny_local/2004/07/02/2004-0 7-02 immigration_1awyer was-fra.html.
63. Id. ("Rivera charged $1,500 to process applications regarding the
Development, Relief and Education for Alien Minors Act of 2003 ('DREAM Act'), a
federal proposal that has not been enacted but that he claimed was passed on Nov.
25, 2003.").
64. New York City Nonprofit Agrees to Pay $1.2 Million to Defrauded
Immigrants, 4 Workplace Immigr. Rep. (BNA) 290 (May 17, 2010) [hereinafter
Nonprofit Agrees to Pay $1.2 Million].
65. Id.
66. Kirk Semple, Green Cards, Belief and Betrayal at a Storefront Church, N.Y.
TIMES, June 17, 2009, at A21, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/06/17/
nyregion/17scheme.html ("[Immigration fraud is] especially insidious... when
practiced by leaders of a church-the institution that many immigrants turn to for




70. Operator of Hindu Temple Arrested in Fraudulent Religious Worker Visa
Scheme, 4 Workplace Immigr. Rep. (BNA) 385 (June 28, 2010) [hereinafter




Victims of immigration fraud are more diverse than the
phrase "notario fraud" suggests. Spanish-speaking immigrants
are common targets because they are the largest immigrant group
in the United States.72 However, immigrants from all over the
world are victims of immigration fraud. In addition to Spanish-
speaking immigrants, targets of reported fraud include Chinese,
Vietnamese,4 Indian," Bangladeshi," Romanian," Haitian," Ja-
maican," and Trinidadian"0 immigrants. Although limited educa-
tion and income may make some immigrants more vulnerable to
fraud, all immigrants are at risk. Even Sascha Herrera, the
college-educated wife of a Georgia state senator, received a
deportation order as a result of bad advice from a notario."
C. Why Immigration Consultant Fraud Is So Prevalent:
The Source of the Problem
An unmet demand for affordable immigration services,
coupled with a vulnerable client population, leaves immigration
law particularly susceptible to unscrupulous entrepreneurs.82 The
large number of immigrants in the United States and their
comparatively low levels of education, English language skills, and
familiarity with the government create a surplus of clients in need
of services. The need for affordable services is especially high
given immigrants' above-average rates of poverty. Compounding
this need is the population's vulnerability, attributable not only to
the aforementioned factors but also to the fact that millions of
72. PEW HISPANIC CTR., STATISTICAL PORTRAIT OF THE FOREIGN-BORN
POPULATION IN THE UNITED STATES, 2007, tbl.3 (2009) available at http://
pewhispanic.org/files/factsheets/foreignborn2007/Table%203.pdf (showing that the
foreign-born population from Mexico was the largest of any region, representing
30.9% of all foreign-born persons in the United States in 2007).
73. See Shannon, supra note 50, at 589.
74. Krissah Williams, For Immigrants, Help Can Be Risky; Maryland
Lawmakers Move to Rein in Consultants Who Overreach and Sometimes Get Clients
Deported, WASH. POST, Apr. 23, 2005, at El.
75. Operator of Hindu Temple Arrested, supra note 70.
76. Ann Mullen, Exploiting Immigrants, METRO TIMES (Nov. 5, 2003), http://
www2.metrotimes.com/editorial/story.asp?id=5587.
77. Id.
78. Cuomo Shuts Down Seven Companies, supra note 60.
79. See Brian Kates, Scammers Crush Immigrants' Hopes, DAILY NEWS (N.Y.),
April 15, 2001, at 6. Two alleged clergymen were charged with defrauding almost
five hundred Caribbean immigrants out of at least $500,000. Id.
80. Id.
81. Larry Copeland, Lawmaker's Wife: Scam Led to Deportation Mix-Up, USA
TODAY, Dec. 6, 2006, at 3A.
82. Moore, supra note 35, at 9.
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immigrants in need of legal help are in the United States without
authorization and thus subject to deportation. Together, these
factors create a market that is easy for fraudulent immigration
consultants to exploit.
The potential client base for immigration consultants and
attorneys exceeds their capacity to serve.' The foreign-born
population in the United States is over thirty-one million." The
Department of Homeland Security estimates that more than ten
million of those individuals are not authorized to reside here.'
Many authorized immigrants seek legal help to adjust or renew
their immigration status or petition for family members to be
admitted, and unauthorized immigrants seek legal help to obtain
authorization; both populations may also seek representation in
deportation proceedings.8 6 Because representation in immigration
proceedings is a privilege and not a right," immigrants must rely
on the private sector for counsel.' Approximately one-half to two-
thirds of immigrants facing immigration-status problems, exclu-
ding naturalization, use legal help." Some immigration
consultant businesses have tens of thousands of clients.90 Even so,
the need for legal services in immigration is not met.9'
While immigrants can, and often do, navigate the law on
their own, several factors increase their need for assistance.
Immigration law is exceedingly complex, making it difficult for
laypeople to decipher. One federal judge noted a "striking resem-
83. Shannon, supra note 50, at 580 ("[Ilt is clear to anybody who has examined
the plight of immigrants in this country that those who need qualified legal
assistance are poorly served by the currently available resources.").
84. The estimated foreign-born population in the United States as of January
2009 was 31,220,000. MICHAEL HOEFER, NANCY RYTINA & BRYAN C. BAKER, U.S.
DE'T OF HOMELAND SEC., ESTIMATES OF THE UNAUTHORIZED IMMIGRANT
POPULATION RESIDING IN THE UNITED STATES: JANUARY 2009, at 3 tbl.2 (2010).
85. The estimated unauthorized resident immigrant population in the United
States as of January 2008 was 10,750,000. Id.
86. See ROBERT L. BACH, INST. FOR RESEARCH ON MULTICULTURALISM AND INT'L
LABOR, BINGHAMTON UNIV., BECOMING AMERICAN, SEEKING JUSTICE: THE
IMMIGRANTS' LEGAL NEEDS STUDY 37-38 (1996).
87. See 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (2006) ("In any removal proceedings before an immi-
gration judge ... the person concerned shall have the privilege of being represented
(at no expense to the Government) by such counsel .. . as he shall choose.").
88. Private attorneys and law firms serviced 55.2% of immigrants receiving
legal help; community and legal aid agencies serviced 17.4%. BACH, supra note 86,
at 47 tbl. 14.
89. Id. at 39 tbl.9.
90. See Nonprofit Agrees to Pay $1.2 Million, supra note 64.
91. Based on a 1993-1994 telephone survey of immigrants in five major cities,
over twenty percent of immigrants wanted, but did not receive, legal help for
immigration matters. BACH, supra note 86, at 42 tbl.11.
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blance between [the immigration] laws ... and King Minos's laby-
rinth in ancient Crete."" In addition, limited education poses an
obstacle to understanding the immigration laws, as up to forty per-
cent of immigrants do not have a high school diploma or the equi-
valent.' Finally, many immigrants do not speak English or do not
speak it well." These individuals must trust others to accurately
translate and/or prepare immigration documents for them.
The client population in immigration law has a higher-than-
average need for affordable legal services. Although many
immigrants would like legal help, they may not be able to afford
it.9 5 In 2009, the median household income of non-citizen
immigrants was $36,089, almost $15,000 less than that of native-
born households." The poverty rate for non-citizen immigrants is
25.1%, in contrast to 13.7% for the native-born population.1
While an unmet need for affordable immigration services
makes the profession profitable, need alone does not explain the
prevalence of fraud. The immigrant population's vulnerability
enables immigration consultants to defraud clients and get away
with it." Many of the same circumstances that create a need for
legal help also leave immigrants vulnerable. Limited education,
low proficiency in English, low income, and illegal status all
increase immigrants' vulnerability."
Immigrants with low proficiency in English are more suscep-
tible to fraud. " It is common for fraudulent immigration consult-
ants to fabricate information on asylum applications,101 just as
92. Lok v. INS, 548 F.2d 37, 38 (2d Cir. 1977).
93. ANDREW SUM, IRWIN KIRSCH & KENTARO YAMAMOTO, EDUC. TESTING SERV.,
A HUMAN CAPITAL CONCERN: THE LITERACY PROFICIENCY OF U.S. IMMIGRANTS 51
(2004).
94. Id. (according to U.S. Census data from 2000, approximately 8.3 million
immigrants did not speak English at all or did not speak it well).
95. Approximately two-thirds of low-income immigrants with legal problems
cannot afford an attorney. BACH, supra note 86, at 56.
96. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, INCOME, POVERTY, AND HEALTH INSURANCE
COVERAGE IN THE UNITED STATES: 2009, at 8 (2010).
97. Id. at 15 tbl.4.
98. See Shannon, supra note 50, at 579-80 ("[I]mmigrants ... are not only ill-
equipped to navigate the system on their own but are easy prey for bad actors who
victimize immigrants by charging ruinous fees for dubious, if not outright
fraudulent and damaging, results.").
99. See Moore, supra note 35, at 8-9.
100. Steven W. Bender, Consumer Protection for Latinos: Overcoming Language
Fraud and English-Only in the Marketplace, 45 AM. U. L. REV. 1027, 1030 (1996)
("Latinos/as and other language minorities [are] the victims of choice for
unscrupulous merchants who prey on their inability to understand the terms of the
bargain.").
101. Cf BACH, supra note 86, at 52 (noting the coincidence of high numbers of
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Dorantes didO" If clients do not read well or understand English
well, it means they are not able to review or understand the
documents they are signing, or the information those documents
contain.
Low-income immigrants are more likely to be defrauded and
less able to seek recourse. In Los Angeles, immigrants who receive
public assistance are twice as likely to use a notario.'w Also, if an
individual with limited income is cheated, he or she may not be
able to afford an attorney afterward to either try again or to
correct the previous mistakes. Many immigrants lose months' or
even years' savings to fraudulent consultants. 104
The more than ten million unauthorized immigrants'05 who
live under the constant threat of deportation are an especially
vulnerable sector of the population. Immigrants who obtain legal
help from notarios are "much more likely to be illegally resident in
the United States than those who turn[] to more formal and
traditional sources of legal help."'" Particular communities are at
higher risk. For example, in Los Angeles, 71.1% of undocumented
immigrants used notarios or immigration consultants, in contrast
to 48% of undocumented immigrants overall. 0 7
II. Attempts to Eliminate Immigration Consultant Fraud
Recognizing the pervasiveness of immigration fraud and its
serious consequences, both the government and community organ-
izations have responded to the problem. Federal law establishes
minimum regulations for immigration assistance and provides for
procedural remedies to fraud in immigration court. "' State legis-
latures have passed more stringent and more particularized stat-
Mexican immigrants using notarios to gain work authorization and the high
numbers of fraudulent or frivolous asylum applications from Mexican immigrants).
102. Nufiez v. Gonzales, 231 F. App'x 666, 668 n.3 (9th Cir. 2007); Brief for
Nufiez, supra note 2, at 8.
103. BACH, supra note 86, at 55 ("[Thirty-three] percent of immigrants who
received public assistance obtained legal help from a notario, compared to 15.4
percent of immigrant households without aid.").
104. See, e.g., Gary Rivlin, Dollars and Dreams: Immigrants as Prey, N.Y. TIMES,
June 11, 2006, § 3 (Sunday Business), at 1 (housekeeper and single mother
"basically spent her entire life's savings"); Kirk Semple & Jenny Manrique, Cuomo
Widens an Investigation into Immigration Fraud, N.Y. TIMES, May 29, 2009, at A18
(taxi driver from Ecuador lost nine months' pay).
105. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
106. BACH, supra note 86, at 53.
107. Id.
108. See infra Part II.A.
4352011]
Law and Inequality
utes seeking to regulate notaries and immigration assistance."
Community and professional organizations focus on promoting
awareness and reporting, and on providing low-cost legal advice."0
A. Federal Law Regulating Representation in Immigration
The Code of Federal Regulations defines who is authorized to
practice immigration law. With certain caveats, persons who may
represent immigrants are attorneys, law students, or graduates;
reputable individuals not receiving remuneration; and BIA-accred-
ited representatives."' "Representation""' includes the "act or
acts of any person appearing in any case, either in person or
through the preparation or filing of any brief or other documents,
paper, application, or petition on behalf of another person or
client,""' and "the incidental preparation of papers."" It does not
include assisting in filling in blank spaces if the assistant receives
only nominal remuneration and does not "hold himself out as
qualified in legal matters or in immigration and naturalization
procedure.""' Thus, an immigration consultant is in violation of
federal law if he or she gives advice on which application a client
should fill out, how an application should be filled out, charges
more than a nominal fee, or holds himself or herself out as
qualified in immigration law. Under current federal law, the
immigration consultant profession is very limited in scope and
profitability. Although BIA-accredited representatives are entitled
to represent aliens, the eligibility requirements are narrow and
accredited representatives are still subject to some restrictions in
their representative capacity. BIA-accredited representatives are
representatives from "non-profit religious, charitable, social
service, or similar organization[s]" that charge only nominal fees
for their services" 6 and have successfully applied for recognition"
and accreditation."' An organization applies for recognition by
filling out an application form and submitting, inter alia,
supporting documentation demonstrating that it charges only
109. See infra Part II.B.
110. See infra Part II.C.
111. 8 C.F.R. § 292.1(a) (2010).
112. Id. § 1.1(m).
113. Id. § 1.1(i).
114. Id. § 1.1(k).
115. Id.
116. Id. § 292.2(a).
117. Id. § 292.2(a)(1).
118. Id. § 292.2(d).
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nominal fees" and that the organization has "adequate
knowledge, information (ready access to adequate legal resources
in its office), and experience."12 Once recognized, the organization
may designate representatives to be accredited. To gain
accreditation, an organization must submit a letter requesting
either partial or full accreditation'. and setting forth the proposed
representative's qualifications,122  along with supporting
documentation."' "Accredited Representatives are subject to the
Rules of Professional Conduct for Practitioners" and may be
119. Nominal fees "have been interpreted to mean a very small quantity or
something existing in name only, as distinguished from something real or actual."
EXEc. OFFICE FOR IMMIGRATION REVIEW, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, RECOGNITION AND
ACCREDITATION PROGRAM OVERVIEW 11 (2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/
eoir/statspub/raroster files/RA.Overview_%202010-10-07.pdf [hereinafter EOIRI
(citing American Paralegal Academy, Inc., 19 I. & N. Dec. 386 (1986)). The BIA has
not set dollar amounts for "nominal fees" but considers them on a case-by-case
basis. Id.
120. The applicable regulation states:
Supporting documentation should include: Proof of adequate staffing and
documentation of any supervision or assistance provided by attorneys,
including proof of the immigration expertise of the attorneys; Resumes of
employees; Letters of recommendation from relevant individuals;
Certificates from training courses, conferences, or other educational
activities; Description of the specific immigration legal services offered;
Legal resource materials and a list of library resources.
Id. at 12.
121. Partial accreditation allows a representative to appear before the
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) only; a fully accredited representative
may appear before DHS, Immigration Courts, and the BIA. Id. at 19.
122. The letter must "[slet forth the nature and extent of the proposed
representative's experience and knowledge of immigration and naturalization law
and procedure." Id. at 21. The statement of qualifications should include:
Resume and information regarding: Length of time that the individual has
been with the organization[;] Training: Training certificates, and/or list of
training/conferences/classes attended[,] details regarding the content of
the training[;] Legal experience, including familiarity with the practice
and procedure of immigration law before the DHS; and [an explanation of]
how the individual will be able to use his or her skills effectively before the
DHS....
Id. at 24. If applying for full accreditation, the proposed representative must also
submit:
Information regarding how the individual possesses skills for effective
litigation and will be able to use his or her skills to represent aliens before
the Immigration Courts, the Board, and the DHS[;] Information regarding
the individual's litigation skills (including for example the ability to
perform legal research, draft briefs or motions, introduce evidence and
question witnesses) and the individual's familiarity with the practice and
procedure of immigration law before [the Executive Office of Immigration
Review] and DHS.
Id. at 25.
123. In addition to documentation supporting the statements regarding
qualifications made in the letter, the proposed representative should also include
letters of recommendation, id. at 23, and re-submit documentation supporting the
organization's recognition, id. at 22.
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sanctioned for violating them.124
B. State Law Regulating Notaries and Immigration Service
Providers
State laws have formed three basic approaches to the
problem of fraudulent immigration consultants: Unauthorized
Practice of Law (UPL) statutes, immigration consultant
regulations, and notary regulations. Most states have statutes
that prohibit and punish the unauthorized practice of law."' For
some states, generalized UPL statutes are the only state laws that
can be used to deter and prosecute fraudulent immigration
consultants." 6 Other states have modified their UPL laws to
specifically address the unauthorized practice of immigration law
in response to immigration consultant fraud.12
Some states have elaborated on the federal law regarding
representation in immigration matters by adding further safe-
guards in the form of immigration consultant statutes.12 These
laws typically define what constitutes "immigration assistance ser-
vice," set parameters for the assistance, and describe unlawful acts
and the corresponding penalties.12 These laws impose a variety of
additional, more specific requirements with which immigration
consultants must comply. Minnesota, for example, requires that
consultants post a notice, conforming to specific size and language,
stating that they are not authorized to give legal advice.
Minnesota law also prohibits assistants from describing them-
selves as a "notary" or an "immigration consultant." It also re-
124. Id. at 18; see 8 C.F.R. §§ 292.3, 1292.3 (2010) ("Professional Conduct for
Practitioners-Rules and Procedures").
125. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 34-3-1 (LexisNexis 2010); ALASKA STAT. § 08.08.230
(2010); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-2701 (2003); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-88 (2005);
FLA. STAT. § 454.23 (West 2007); HAW. REV. STAT. § 605-14 (1993); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 37:213 (2007); MASS. ANN. LAWS ch. 221, § 46A (LexisNexis 1999); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 7.285 (LexisNexis 2008); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2524 (West 2004);
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 16-16-1(2004); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 757.30 (West 2001).
126. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 34-3-1; ALASKA STAT. § 08.08.230; FLA. STAT. § 454.23;
MASS. GEN. LAws ch. 221, § 46A; NEV. REV. STAT. § 7.285; Wis. STAT. ANN. § 757.30;
WYo. STAT. ANN. § 33-5-117 (2009).
127. See, e.g., Immigration and Nationality Law Practice Act, ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 12-2701 to -2704 (elevating unauthorized practice of immigration law to a
class 6 felony); see Cisneros, supra note 47, for analysis of the Immigration and
Nationality Law Practice Act as a response to Arizona's widespread problem of
notario fraud.
128. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 22440-48 (West 2008); 815 ILL. COMP.
STAT. ANN. 505/2AA (West 1999); MICH. COMP. LAws §§ 338.3451-71 (2004); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 325E.031 (West 1996); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 460-a to -j (McKinney
2010).
129. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22441.
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quires consultants to provide customers with contracts containing
a description of services to be performed, corresponding com-
pensation, and a statement that the consultant must return all of
the client's documents, before providing assistance.' California's
regulations are even more comprehensive. In addition to more
stringent posting, contract, and receipt requirements, California
requires fingerprinting and background checks. California con-
sultants must file a $50,000 bond with the state accompanied by a
copy of a valid identification, a photograph, and personal and con-
tact information. California posts consultants' bond compliance,
photograph, and background check status on its website."'
Finally, some states have targeted immigration fraud
through notary statutes."' These rules prohibit and/or require
certain practices and apply only to notaries public. Some of these
statutes are effectively notary-specific versions of UPL statutes,
prohibiting notaries from giving legal advice or holding themselves
out as legal consultants or immigration consultants."' Some
states have posting or notice requirements that apply only to
notaries who also choose to use the term "notario.""' Other states
prohibit notaries from using the term "notario" at all."'
130. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325E.031.
131. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 22440-48. California also has one of the most
severe penalty structures; violations may result in civil penalties, criminal
conviction punishable by fines and/or imprisonment, actual and treble damages, or
injunction. Id. §§ 22445-48.
132. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-109-103 (West 2005); GA. CODE ANN. § 45-17-
8.2 (West 2002); NEB. REv. ST. § 64-105.03 (2004); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 194.166
(West 2003 & Supp. 2010); TENN. CODE ANN. § 8-16-402 (2002); TEX. GOV'T CODE
ANN. § 406.017 (West 2001).
133. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 45-17-8.2, OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 194.166; TENN.
CODE ANN. § 8-16-402. The Georgia statute reads: "A notary shall not make claims
to have or imply he or she has powers, qualifications, rights, or privileges that the
office of notary does not authorize, including the powers to counsel on immigration
matters and to give legal advice." GA. CODE ANN. § 45-17-8.2(a).
134. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-109-103. The statute requires notaries using
the term "notario" in any advertisement to also include the following statement:
I AM NOT A LICENSED ATTORNEY AND CANNOT ENGAGE IN THE
PRACTICE OF LAW. I AM NOT A REPRESENTATIVE OF ANY
GOVERNMENTAL AGENCY WITH AUTHORITY OVER IMMIGRATION
OR CITIZENSHIP AND I CANNOT OFFER LEGAL ADVICE OR OTHER
ASSISTANCE REGARDING IMMIGRATION.
Id. § 4-109-103(a).
135. See, e.g., NEB. REV. ST. § 64-105.03(6) ("A notary public who is not an
attorney may not use the term notario publico or any equivalent non-English term
in any business card, advertisement, notice, or sign.").
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C. The Role of Community Organizations in Policing
Immigration Consultant Fraud
Community organizations play an important role in both
preventing and remedying fraud. The American Bar Association
Commission on Immigration, for example, founded the Fight
Notario Fraud project.'36 This project aims to end immigration
consulting fraud by providing the public with information on how
to report fraud, facilitating the referral of individual victims to
attorneys who might represent them pro bono, and providing
attorneys with pleadings and other legal forms useful in pursuing
a case against fraudulent immigration consultants. 7  Other
community organizations help by providing free legal services,
drop-in clinics, or hotlines for immigrants."' Most commonly, local
and national organizations fight fraud through awareness
campaigns and by directing complaints.'
III. Reasons Why Immigration Consultant Fraud Persists
Although the federal government, state governments, and
community organizations have all mounted defenses against
fraud, it has continued seemingly undeterred and in the open."0
The fraud persists because the laws are not properly tailored to
the problem, the laws in effect are under-enforced, and the source
of the problem-the unmet need for legal services-continues.
A. Misguided Laws and Regulations
Both state and federal laws somewhat miss the mark. First,
many states do not have laws directly addressing the problem and
instead rely on general UPL statutes."' However, these statutes
136. Fight Notario Fraud, AM. BAR ASS'N COMM'N ON IMMIGRATION,
http://new.abanet.orglImmigration/Pages/FightNotarioFraud.aspx (last visited Apr.
8, 2011).
137. Id.
138. See, e.g., Leslie Casamir, We'll Help You Become a Citizen, DAILY NEWS
(N.Y.), Apr. 17, 2005, at 21 (publicizing the week-long immigration help hotline
sponsored by the Daily News and the City University of New York).
139. For example, the American Immigration Lawyers Association (AILA) has
advocacy tools, such as public service announcements, available for public use on
its website. AILA-Unauthorized Practice of Law, AM. IMMIGRATION LAWYERS
ASS'N, http://www.aila.org/issues/issue.aspx?docid=25960 (last visited Apr. 12,
2011). AILA also published a state-by-state guide to help victims take legal action
against immigration consultants and notarios. How and Where to File Complaints
Against Notarios and Immigration Consultants, AM. IMMIGRATION LAWYERS Ass'N,
(Nov. 30, 2009), http://www.aila.org/content/default.aspx?docid=26749.
140. See supra Part I.
141. See supra note 125 (listing relevant state statutes).
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historically lack public support because they are seen as being
aimed at preserving a professional monopoly as opposed to
protecting consumers.14 Second, many states have approached the
problem by regulating notaries public more stringently.'4
However, these laws are simultaneously under- and over-inclusive;
the majority of individuals to whom these laws apply, namely
notaries, are not engaged in fraud, and, because only some of those
who do engage in immigration consultant fraud are actually
notaries,'" there are many individuals engaged in fraud who are
not subject to the rules. Third, although the federal laws seek to
allow qualified non-lawyers to represent immigrants through BIA
accreditation, the attempt falls woefully short. Only 1039 indivi-
duals were BIA-accredited representatives as of November 2010,'"
compared to the approximately twenty-three million non-citizen
immigrants living in the United States.'" Fourth, various state
laws may conflict with the federal laws, rendering them ineffective
due to conflict preemption. 147
B. Under-Enforcement of Current Laws
Even more importantly, under-enforcement of both state and
federal laws undermines their effectiveness. An important obsta-
cle to proper enforcement is under-reporting. The victims of
fraudulent immigration consultants are unlikely to report them
since many of the victims are unauthorized immigrants." Many
of these undocumented victims, like Nufiez, are deported as a re-
sult of the consultant's fraud, making contact and cooperation with
local law enforcement impractical.'14  More commonly, undocu-
mented victims will not report these individuals for fear of dis-
closing their immigration status to government officials during the
investigation and being deported as a result."o Finally, many im-
142. Alexandra M. Ashbrook, The Unauthorized Practice of Law in Immigration:
Examining the Propriety of Non-Lawyer Representation, 5 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
237, 245-46 (1991).
143. See supra note 132 (listing relevant state statutes).
144. See supra Part I.B.
145. Recognition & Accreditation (R&A) Program, EXEC. OFFICE OF IMMIGRA-
TION REVIEW, http://www.justice.gov/eoir/statspub/raroster.htm (follow "Accredited
Representatives List" hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 3, 2011).
146. Approximately 10.8 million unauthorized immigrants were living in the
United States as of January 2009. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
147. See Moore, supra note 35, at 21-26.
148. See id. at 9.
149. Langford, supra note 30, at 124.
150. See id. at 134 (proposing safe harbor provisions for immigrants who report
notarios or whose status is disclosed in the process of investigating a notario).
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migrants, authorized or not, may not know how to report viola-
tions or to whom, and many harbor a distrust of government so
they may not report violations anyway."' Even when complaints
are made, it almost always falls to the state attorney general's
office to investigate and prosecute the crime because few states
have statutes providing a private cause of action.'52 However, only
a few attorneys general have taken up the torch and begun to ag-
gressively pursue immigration fraud." 3 In most states, the fraud
is only classified as a misdemeanor, but recently some states, like
Arizona, have re-classified it as a felony.'" Enforcement on the
federal level has been noticeably absent." Some have suggested
that the federal government chooses not to enforce the laws but
instead utilizes the fraud against immigrant victims to flag them
for deportation."'
C. Failure to Address the Source of the Problem
Regardless of whether the laws are enforced after the fact,
fraud will continue to exist until the source of the problem is suf-
ficiently addressed. "[N]otarios have stepped forth to fill the gap
between the demand [of] ... immigrants for affordable and
151. Robert A. Katzmann, The Legal Profession and the Unmet Needs of the
Immigrant Poor, 21 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 3, 8 (2008).
152. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 22446.5 (West 2008) (allowing any
individual, not just the defrauded immigrant, to bring a civil action against the
immigration consultant).
153. In 2009, then-New York Attorney General Andrew Cuomo issued more
than fifty subpoenas as part of a "sweeping investigation into immigration fraud."
Press Release, Office of the Attorney Gen., Cuomo Launches Sweeping
Investigation into Immigration Fraud Across the New York City Area (May 28,
2009), available at http://www.ag.ny.gov/media center/2009/may/may28a_09.html.
Cuomo prosecuted several immigration consultants who scammed immigrants out
of millions of dollars. See supra notes 55, 60. Texas Attorney General Greg Abbott
launched a similar campaign against immigration fraud in 2003, filing twenty-
three lawsuits in one year and encouraging the federal district attorneys to do the
same, resulting in four criminal actions. Addison Thompson, The Office of the State
Attorney General and the Protection of Immigrant Communities: Exploring an
Expanded Role, 38 COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 387, 402 (2007).
154. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 12-2701 to -2704 (2009).
155. However, recent announcements by the federal government may foretell
increased enforcement. See Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Immigration Scam
Shut Down by FTC (Jan. 31, 2011), available at http://www.ftc.gov/opal
2011/01/immigration.shtm (announcing the FTC's first immigration fraud
enforcement action); Suzanne Gamboa, Feds Targeting Fake Immigration Lawyers,
ABC NEWS, Mar. 9, 2011, http://abcnews.go.com/US/wireStory?id=13095768.
156. In a California case, INS discerned a pattern of improper filings by a
notario but, instead of investigating the notario, it flagged applications from the
notario for denial of the requested benefits. See Moore, supra note 35, at 25 (citing
Edwin Garcia, Activists Who Fall Through the Cracks, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS,
Aug. 25, 2003, at 1A).
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culturally and linguistically competent help from the legal commu-
nity and the supply of such services."' 7 The lack of legal services
available to the poor in this country is well documented;'" this
affects immigrant communities in particular because foreign-born
are more likely to live in poverty than native-born and there is a
high correlation between poverty and recency of arrival.' Immi-
grants, undocumented immigrants in particular, are most likely to
find help through a referral by a family member or friend, and
notarios are often part of the community and the immigrants'
networks, fueling their businesses and their clients' trust in
them.'60 Clearly, the lack of affordable and accessible legal help is
the most significant factor in the persistence of immigration
consultant fraud. 6 1
IV. Expanding and Legitimizing the Role of Immigration
Consultants Through Federal Accreditation
Expanding the boundaries of lawful immigration assistance
would address the ongoing source of fraud by increasing the
accessibility of competent, accountable immigration service pro-
viders. While increased enforcement and prosecution would be
useful, post hoc measures can only do so much to eliminate fraud;
legalizing and regulating immigration consultants would help
prevent fraud by meeting the need that fuels it. Accomplishing
this requires amending the current federal regulations, since they
constitute the "floor" for regulation, and any state laws that direct-
ly conflict with the amended regulations. The federal government
does not currently regulate immigration consultants. Rather, the
regulations effectively prohibit the profession by defining repre-
sentation broadly and excluding immigration consultants from
those allowed to engage in representation.'62 Perhaps proving the
inadequacy of the federal regulations, most states have put a gloss
on them by enacting specific requirements and prohibitions for no-
taries and/or immigration consultants.'" The federal government
should expand and amend its current scheme for accrediting non-
lawyer representatives to create a class of immigration consult-
ants that can lawfully assist in certain legal matters, such as de-
157. Langford, supra note 30, at 126.
158. See id. at 118.
159. See id.
160. See id. at 116.
161. Moore, supra note 35, at 3.
162. See 8 C.F.R. §§ 1.1(i), (k), (m), 292.1(a) (2010).
163. See supra Part II.B.
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termining eligibility for and filling out visa applications, for rea-
sonable compensation. Legitimizing immigration consultants al-
lows the government to regulate them, ensuring competency and
accountability. Under this scheme, the market that fraudulent
consultants currently exploit would be flushed with knowledgeable
professionals charging fair prices. While fraud and incompetency
would undoubtedly persist, as they do to some extent in all sectors,
they would no longer be the norm, but the deviation.
A. Proposed Changes to the Federal Regulations
1. Accessibility
The federal regulations should be amended to allow more
non-lawyers to represent immigrants in basic matters. Currently,
immigration consultants are only allowed to notarize and to "[fill
in] blank spaces on printed Service forms."'" Only persons from
"non-profit religious, charitable, social service, or similar organi-
zation[s]" are eligible to advise and advocate for immigrants as
BIA-accredited representatives.'" The federal government should
preserve BIA accreditation, but abdicate the strict eligibility re-
quirement. This would create a larger class of non-lawyers enga-
ging in legal representation while maintaining the government's
regulatory control over them.
To increase the number of accredited representatives, the
regulations must be amended to increase not only eligibility, but
also profitability. Currently, non-lawyer representatives may re-
ceive only "nominal" consideration in exchange for their services."
This limitation serves a useful purpose, ensuring that the repre-
sentatives mean to help and not merely to take advantage of immi-
grant clients. However, the same purpose would nonetheless be
served if representatives were entitled to "reasonable" com-
pensation instead.'67 Permitting reasonable compensation would
encourage more individuals to become accredited representatives,
as the profession could actually be a profitable one.'" It would
also benefit BIA-recognized non-profit organizations.'69 Such
164. 8 C.F.R. § 1.1(k).
165. Id. § 292.2(a).
166. Id. § 1.1(k).
167. Alternatively, the EOIR could set maximum fees, like the Social Security
Administration does. See Moore, supra note 35, at 31 n.181; see also Langford,
supra note 30, at 134 (proposing replacing the nominal charge requirement with a
maximum fee schedule to encourage more people to apply for accreditation).
168. Langford, supra note 30, at 134.
169. Moore, supra note 35, at 30. In 1995, the BIA proposed eliminating the
444 [Vol. 29:425
IMMIGRATION CONSULTANT FRAUD
organizations could charge fees according to their clients' ability to
pay, increasing their overall budget and thus the number of
individuals to whom they can provide competent yet affordable
services. 0
These changes to the existing federal regulations would
expand the immigration consultant profession by legitimizing it
through government accreditation and by providing the opportu-
nity for reasonable profits. However, expanding the number of
service providers is not the only way non-lawyer representation
would make immigration services more accessible. Eliminating
the financial burden of earning a law degree means accredited rep-
resentatives may charge lower rates and also may have lower
earning expectations,"' making their services more affordable
than those of a lawyer. To the extent that most attorneys are non-
Hispanic Whites while the largest immigrant groups in the United
States are not,12 eliminating the burden of earning a law degree
should increase the likelihood that service providers come from
within immigrant communities and/or have a first language other
than English. Thus, increasing non-lawyer representation could
make immigration services more accessible financially,
linguistically, and culturally.
2. Competency
The most essential building block for a competent class of
immigration consultants is proper training and education on im-
migration law. Currently, the BIA relies on non-lawyer appli-
cants' experience with immigration law to establish their
knowledge and competency."' While experience could remain an
option for those who have it, a certification program or a tech-
nominal fee restriction, and the proposal was supported by the non-profit
immigration law community as a positive change. Id.
170. See id.
171. Most law school graduates have more than $80,000 in student loan debt,
which costs them more than $1000 a month for ten years to repay. AM. BAR ASS'N
COMM'N ON LOAN REPAYMENT AND FORGIVENESS, LIFTING THE BURDEN: LAW
STUDENT DEBT AS A BARRIER TO PUBLIC SERVICE 9 (2003), available at http://
www.americanbar.org/content/dam/abalmigrated/legalservices/sclaidlrap/download
s/1rapfinalreport.authcheckdam.pdf. Sixty-six percent of students said that law
school debt kept them from considering lower-paying public interest and
government jobs. Id.
172. In 2000, 88.8% of lawyers were categorized as "White, not Hispanic." AM.
BAR ASS'N, LAWYER DEMOGRAPHICS (2009), available at http://www.americanbar.
org/content/dam/abalmigrated/marketresearchlPublicDocuments/LawyerDemogra
phics.authcheckdam.pdf.
173. See EOIR, supra note 119, at 12.
174. "In Detroit, the [INS] district office actually gave out certificates [to those
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nical degree would provide reliable information and training to
those who wish to become accredited representatives but have no
prior experience in immigration law. This would provide an ave-
nue for people to learn about and enter the profession by preparing
them for accreditation. Such training could be provided directly by
the government"17 or by public or private educational institutions.
To guarantee the competency of non-lawyer practitioners
without overburdening the BIA, the accreditation requirements
should be simplified: an accreditation exam would measure each
applicant's knowledge efficiently and uniformly. Currently,
individuals from BIA-recognized organizations apply for
accreditation by submitting a letter, resume, and various support-
ing documentation showing their good moral character, training
and experience, and access to legal resources.' 7 While this process
is commendably thorough, it is neither efficient nor uniform and it
would require tremendous resources if the number of applicants
for accreditation increased. Instead, the BIA should administer an
exam testing individuals' knowledge of immigration law and
professional ethics. This exam would be administered akin to any
other professional or paraprofessional licensing exam, except that
it would be administered federally, not by states, because
immigration is a federal matter.7m
Finally, to ensure ongoing competency, the BIA should
preserve its renewal requirement for accreditation. Currently, ac-
credited representatives must submit an application for renewal of
accreditation every three years to maintain their status."' The
requirement for renewal should be preserved to ensure that immi-
gration consultants keep current on the law, but the process for
renewal, like the initial accreditation process, should be amended.
To ensure the representatives' continued professional integrity,
the government should check for criminal activity and allegations
of misconduct. To ensure the representatives' continued compe-
tency, the government should either require proof that consultants
completed a certain number of continuing immigration education
who completed its training sessions], indicating that the recipient was qualified to
fill out specific forms. This conduct apparently occurs in other parts of the
country." Moore, supra note 35, at 24-25 n.145.
175. "INS district offices have conducted training sessions for non-accredited,
non-attorneys informing them of types of forms and benefits that may be provided."
Id. at 24; see Ashbrook, supra note 142, at 276 n.222.
176. See supra notes 121-123 and accompanying text.
177. The Department of the Treasury and the Patent and Trademark Office both
evaluate non-attorney competency for representation by administering exams. See
Moore, supra note 35, at 32 & n.185.
178. 8 C.F.R. § 292.2(d) (2010).
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hours or require them to pass the exam again. Either of these
steps would be more efficient and uniform than the current
application procedure.
3. Integrity and Accountability
To ensure the integrity of accredited representatives,
applicants should be subject to certain minimum eligibility and
practice requirements. To be eligible for accreditation, applicants
should have to submit to fingerprinting and pass background
checks.'7 9 This will help keep criminals and known frauds from
legally entering the profession. Once accredited, there should be
minimum practice requirements that representatives must comply
with. For example, consultants may be required to conspicuously
post statements of the services they are not authorized to
provide,' or, given the well-documented confusion surrounding
the term "notario,"m' the government might prohibit any
immigration consultant from using the term in advertising or self-
description.'8 2 Such requirements would help prevent fraud by
keeping clients informed, and because violations could easily be
proven, would help the government punish fraud.
To help prevent and punish immigration consultant fraud,
the accredited representatives must be accountable to the govern-
ment and to their clients. Currently, BIA-accredited representa-
tives are subject to sanctions for violating federal professional
responsibility requirements. 18 This accountability should be pre-
served since it serves as a deterrent and a means of punishment.
However, the government should add more safeguards to keep
accredited representatives accountable to their clients. The BIA
should post each applicant's name, license number, accreditation
status, sanction history, and photo on its website. The govern-
ment could also require accredited representatives to conspicu-
ously display their names, license numbers, and the BIA web
179. See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 22440-48 (West 2008) (requiring both).
180. See, e.g., id.; MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325E.031 (West 1996). Both statutes
require immigration consultants to post a disclaimer.
181. See supra Part I.A.
182. See, e.g., NEB. REV. ST. § 64-105.03 (2004). As a Spanish substitute for
"notario," immigration consultants could instead call themselves "consultor/a
inmigratorio/a" or "consultor/a de inmigracian," which would more literally
translate into "immigration consultant" and therefore avoid being misleading. See
SAINT DAHL, supra note 46, at 45, 380.
183. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
184. See e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 22440-48 (requiring posting of each




address in their office, and/or include this information on all con-
tracts and receipts. This would allow consumers to check the sta-
tus of a representative, prevent consultants from falsely claiming
representation, and give consumers an easier mechanism to report
abuses. An accompanying advertising campaign targeted at immi-
grant communities would ensure that the meaning of accreditation
and how to verify it become common knowledge and practice.
B. Feasibility of Expanded Accreditation
Although allowing immigration consultants to become
accredited and work for profit is a dramatic departure from the
current regulations, it is not impractical. While enlarging the
class of accredited representatives and increasing the BIA's regu-
lation of them would require more resources, "' it would also save
the government resources over the long term. The accreditation
exam is much more efficient from a financial perspective than the
current individualized application procedure. The preparation for
accreditation could be provided by educational institutions instead
of the government, or the government could provide the training
for a profit. More importantly, the availability of competent and
affordable representatives should decrease the amount of govern-
ment resources currently wasted on reviewing meritless visa ap-
plications, struggling to make correct determinations at confusing
hearings, and prolonged appeals from deportation orders.186
Although this Article does not contemplate allowing
immigration consultants to perform the same spectrum of services
that an attorney could, any non-attorney representation is an
objectionable proposal for many. Proponents of UPL laws would
criticize the expansion of accredited representations as compro-
mising the legal profession's integrity and putting the public at
risk.'m However, non-attorney representation is already an
accepted practice among other federal agencies, with no apparent
detriment to the profession or the public.'" The U.S. Department
of the Treasury allows different categories of non-lawyers to pre-
pare tax forms, advise clients regarding Internal Revenue Service
matters, and appear in agency proceedings." The U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office also allows non-attorneys to prosecute
185. Moore, supra note 35, at 32.
186. See id. at 6 (describing how fraud burdens the immigration administrative
system).
187. See Ashbrook, supra note 142, at 265.




patent applications as registered agents.'" Of course, the BIA also
already allows non-attorneys, including accredited representa-
tives, law students, and "reputable individuals," to appear before
it.m91 Expanding the current accreditation system would not be
unprecedented in the federal government.
Conclusion
The problem of immigration consultant fraud continues to
plague immigrant communities. Unscrupulous immigration con-
sultants or "notarios" hold themselves out as qualified to provide
legal advice and services, defrauding their clients and cheating
them out of money and a chance to live in the United States
legally. Immigrants are particularly vulnerable to fraud because a
large percentage of them are relatively poor, isolated (many do not
speak English or understand the U.S. government system), and
often reluctant or unable to report the problem. Federal and state
laws have attempted to combat this fraud by restricting the lawful
conduct of immigration consultants and creating civil and criminal
sanctions for those who venture into the practice of law. Yet the
fraud persists, not only because the laws are under-enforced, but
also because they do not address the source of the problem-a lack
of affordable and accessible legal services in immigrant commu-
nities. This Article proposes to amend the federal regulations in
order to expand and legitimize the immigration consultant
profession by allowing more non-lawyers to offer limited immi-
gration law services for reasonable fees. Making immigration
assistance a viable, regulated profession would dramatically
increase the availability of competent legal services to immigrants,
meeting the need that fraudulent practitioners have exploited.
190. Id.
191. 8 C.F.R. § 291.2(a) (2010).
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